Threats Watch’s Steve Schippert sent along the following info, while noting that the Iranian weapons could also have been purchased on the black market as well as via direct sale from Iran::
Here goes on my compiled list of Hamas weapons.
Gaza-manufactured from smuggled & made explosives, materials.
Hundreds, replenished on demand.
Range: ~17 km
Katyusha rockets (Iran and indigenous copies)
Hundreds, fewer than Qassams
Range: ~24 km
Fajr-3 variant Katyushas (Iranian)
Being reported tonight as if it’s new development. Actually, about a year or so. Like other weapons and Hizballah-like tactics, this development coincides with being well inside the Iranian orbit – which is to say, largely since Hamas took Gaza by force in ’07.
SA-7 (Russian design, Iranian manufacture, training) Sapper
Anti-aircraft, shoulder-fired (MANPAD)
Impact: Can’t take out IAF jets, but are assault helo killers.
This is a big, big deal.
Note: We had a rash of SA-7 shots being taken and downing our choppers in one corridor in Iraq (Sea Stallions, CH-46’s [both carrying troops], Appache/cobras) – and Britain lost a Lynx helo to one in Basra. We started whacking Iranians shortly after and the SA-7 supply stopped. As an old anti-aircraft Marine, I noted to Pentagon sophisticated tactics being employed by terrorist crews (Thanks to their penchant for publishing propaganda videos of their snuffs), suggesting advanced training in/by Iran. Not a simple weapon. Got a quiet nod in response. FYI.
Note II: In all the news video of the Israeli raids, you don’t see Israeli attack helicopters hovering over Gaza City this time, do you? Well…
AT-14 Kornet anti-tank missiles
Dozens, and that public estamation was about a year & a half ago, so…
Range: ~5.5 km
Impact: Kornet penetrates both Merkava (IDF) and M-1 Abrams armor and, like the anti-aircraft missiles, is a big deal, even bigger actually.
Note: This is what was killing most IDF soldiers in ’06 summer war w/Hizballah in Lebanon. It is what primarily gives Israel hesitation to go into Gaza with ground incursion. Period. One israeli general said in ’06 or ’07 that this weapon in Hamas’ hands constitutes a “shift in the strategic balance.” The Merkava has always been the IDF’s invincible beast, and getting them whacked damages the israeli public psyche (IMHO) even more than the forces wading into battle.
Note II: Like the SA-7, we experienced several Kornet hits which killed our M-1 Abrams tanks in Iraq. Unclear whether a Russian supply (via Iran) for Russian military’s live-fire proving ground or whether just another Iranian feed into Iraq. Either way, note with distinction here the Iranian parallel, as elsewhere on this list.
The standard issue Russian model seen in conflicts in the region.
Numbers: Undetermined estimates, but looking.
Note: Some reports included reference to “double-impact RPG’s” mentioned separately while later referencing Kornets (above) as well. technically, the Kornet is a double-impact missile. One explosive hits, heats & weakens/softens armor, while second part pierces through, getting inside the vehicle & explodes. RPG is very short range & unguided. Kornet is guided and, again, 5.5 KM range (missile v. RPG difference).
DsHK .50 caliber machine guns (Russian design, called the dashka [or ‘kiss’])
Numbers: Few, but that’s as of a couple years ago.
Note: If you saw Blackhawk Down, then you know what a “technical” is: a small pickup with a .50 caliber mounted on the back. Our (US) Browning M2 .50 caliber machine gun is the baddest bulk lead thrower we have, with an accurate (relative) effective range of over a KM. I’ve personally blasted vehicles on a range at greater distance by ‘walking the dog’ in to the target. This is a scary sunofabiscuiteater in an urban environment.
Additional Standard Lot Weapons:
- Thousands of AK’s smuggled in since ’06
- Millions, perhaps tens of millions, of rounds for them
- Sniper rifles & scopes
- Night-vision goggles and scopes (not standard lot, but not many suspected)
- Various small arms (pistols)
- Tons of explosives (military grade) & raw materials for making explosives
Tunnels: Hamas is adopting Hizballah’s (Iranian) tactics. Of course, they ahve always been quite gifted at employing human shields, but their use of tunnels is important to understand. They had long been using them under the Philidephi line and into Egypt’s side for smuggling. But they learned from Hizballah in the ’06 summer war that tunnels are invaluable in an urban defense. They are not quite up to Hizballah’s level of labyrinth yet, but they have been digging like rabbits for two years under Gaza. You don’t see this, obviously. But it is keenly known by the IDF. In the past, hamas’ prize operation was a sucide bomber in a cafe or bus. Now, it is to lure the IDF in on an incursion and kill them from a defensive position (far better position) instead, and let the rockets do the terrorizing of the civ population. Parts of iran, it should be noted, are labyrinthed with tunnels, especially after being spooked about a US invasion circa 05/06.
Iranian Training: Iran has been bringing in Hamas terrorists for training (in Iran, Syria and Lebanon) since it became the prime benefactor for Hamas after the West cut the group off when they launched in effect a civil war against Fatah in Gaza and took the strip by force. This is important for several reasons:
- Training on the implementation, layout etc of an effective tunnel system of urban defense.
- Training on advanced weapons Hamas has never had (SA-7 anti-aircraft, AT-14 Kornet anti-tank missile, Fajr-3 long(er) range Katyusha missiles, etc.
- Advanced explosives manufacture (think EFP’s [Explosively Formed Penetrators, the Iranian molten copper raodside bomb] here too, the top killer of our boys in Iraq). Did you know that over 10% of our total combat fatailities in Iraq were from the Iranian EFP?
I’ll mercifully cut this long note off here. Sorry for length – but then, the list you asked for is long, longl, long. Whats more impartant than any list is using it to define a context.
Overall point, therefor, is that much of the above should make it clear why Israel is so hesitant to go in on the ground. They will not lose there, but the cost will be higher than the Israeli population has ever considered for a Gaza operation before. And with their small population and small – though potent – armed force, each casualty is a deeper tragedy than for other forces/societies.
This high-cost defense is the benefit for Hamas of doing business with Iran, and Hamas is acting at the pleasure of the Iranian regime. It is an unprecidented deterent for the Palestinian terrorists. Iran holds the pur$e $tring$ and they and Hamas share a common hated enemy, which makes following Iranian strategic direction palatable for Hamas leadership. Said in discussion this week that Hamas, in embracing Iran, has exchanged strategic ‘sovreignty’ for tactical lethality. Iran, quite simply, can’t be extracted from the Hamas equation or the current escalation.