HH: You know, from time to time, books come out and I bring the author or authors onto the program for an extended interview. I did that a year and a half ago with Lawrence Wright when The Looming Tower came out. And I told you then it would win the Pulitzer, which it did in 2007. I’ve done it with other books, and I’m happy to do it again today. And if you are doing something, you’ll want to sit down and just listen, or you’re going to want to go for a long drive if you’re in the car, and get stuck in a traffic jam, because this next program on The Nuclear Jihadist: The True Story Of The Man Who Sold The World’s Most Dangerous Secrets, And How We Could Have Stopped Him, is the only book since Helter Skelter to keep me awake at night. And I’m pleased to welcome Douglas Frantz and Catherine Collins to the program. Douglas and Catherine, welcome, it’s good to have you on.
CC: Thank you.
DF: Thanks very much, Hugh. It’s great to be with you, and thanks for that good introduction.
CC: Thank you.
HH: Well, it’s a fascinating book, and I want to start by telling folks that you’re a husband and wife reporter team. Douglas Frantz is now at Portfolio, formerly managing editor of the Los Angeles Times. Catherine’s been a reporter for the Chicago Tribune, also written for the Times and the New York Times. They’re both prolific authors. But this one is different. Let’s start, and I’ll go back and forth with you guys. Doug, give us a little background on how you decided to write this particular book.
DF: This is the fifth book that Cathy and I have done together, and it’s by far the most complicated, and I think the most important. It started out, actually, Hugh, as an assignment for me from the Los Angeles Times. I was based in Istanbul as the first foreign investigative reporter in the history of the Times in early 2003, and I talked with John Carroll and Dean Baquet and Marjorie Miller, the foreign editor, about what topic I should tackle first. And we all agreed that nuclear proliferation was the most important issue facing the world today, because it intersects with so many other issues, including terrorism and our troubles with other countries. At that point, Iran wasn’t really much on our radar yet. And so I started out doing a series of sort of long investigative pieces for the Los Angeles Times, and I came across A.Q. Khan and his activities as a rogue Pakistani scientist very early on in that process. And I worked on it for the Times for about two and a half years doing various stories. And near the end of the second year, it was apparent to Catherine and I that this was a topic that really needed more work. And so she started working alongside of me, gathering material for the book.
HH: Now Catherine, before we go any further, let me ask you not as a reporter but as a spouse. The L.A. Times calls up and says we’d like you to go to Pakistan. This is after the murder of Daniel Pearl. How did that news reach you?
CC: Oh, obviously, I was very concerned. But we stayed in touch, and you know, sometimes you do things that make you a little anxious, and you’d rather not do. But really, the more important thing is the story. And you have to take those risks sometimes, because this story was very important to get out, and to air these issues.
HH: Let’s begin, then, by talking about after you told the L.A. Times you’re going to write a book. Did they give you a book leave, Douglas? Or did you just say I’ve got to devote full time to this?
DF: No, I’ve always balanced my day job with writing books. And I’m able to do that because Cathy and I work so well together. But no, actually, we had just started roughing out the outline of the book when I became managing editor in the fall of 2005. So they certainly didn’t give me anything like a book leave. We had a lot of balls in the air for quite a while there until we finished this book. And I finished my job at the L.A. Times, too.
CC: You know, some people play golf or bridge or something. We tend to spend our evenings working on these projects, and weekends, too.
HH: That’s a lot of excitement for an evening.
HH: Catherine, tell me a little bit about the reception of the book. Obviously, we’re talking at the beginning of February, 2008. This is the initial time that the interview aired. The book came out in December, so it hadn’t had a lot of time yet, but how’s the reception?
DF: Well, it’s been surprising. There’s been a lot of attention in the press. We’ve done several big op-ed pieces. There have been very good reviews. The Economist, in early January, just gave us a four star review. It was very heartening. And yet, the sales are pretty slow. And I think as we’ve looked back over the history of books about nuclear issues, they, almost all of them, have sold pretty slowly. And as we puzzle over why, because of the good reviews, because the news has rolled out right on the cycle of this book with the problems in Pakistan, and the problems in Iran continuing, we can’t quite figure out why this isn’t selling better. But I think that nuclear catastrophe is an unthinkable prospect for most people, and particularly for Americans who tend to live in a cocoon, even after 9/11. And so people don’t want to think about it, they don’t want to read about it. But you know, we sure believe that they should, and that’s one of the reasons why we’re so happy to be on this show and to get to your audience especially.
HH: Well, I think it’s going to develop legs, and I’ll tell you why. The same thing happened with The Looming Tower, because it’s a profoundly riveting read. I mean, it carries you along, page after page. It’s a detective story. But it also has these implications about I didn’t know that, and that changes my worldview. And Catherine, let me ask you, when you began this, did you know anything about Khan or what he had been up to until you dove in?
CC: No, I didn’t. I just started to read Doug’s stories, obviously, and you know, we’d talk at night about these, and over coffee and lunch, and pretty soon, he got me into the subject just as strongly as he was. It’s a fascinating story. Dr. Khan is like the real life Dr. No.
HH: You’re absolutely right about that, and he’s a chilling kind of character. And let’s start there. Actually, let’s start earlier than that. Douglas, to get this set up right, I think we have to begin with the partition of India. Now people are going to sit there and hear me say that, and they’re going to say what? And in fact, it’s all about the partition of India after World War II.
DF: You’re right, Hugh. This is an integral action in history that’s led to A.Q. Khan becoming this real life Dr. No. In 1947, the British partitioned India, and they created the state of India, and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Pakistan was set up as a refuge for Muslims. And tens of thousands of them began streaming into this new country of Pakistan, both East Pakistan and West Pakistan, at that time, divided by the thumb of India sticking up there. And A.Q. Khan was 11 years old during that period. And this had an impact on him that stayed with him his whole life, because he saw thousands of Muslims being persecuted and massacred by their Hindu rivals in India. And this affected him. It created a deep-seated hatred of India. He remained with his mother and father in India. They were living in Bhopal, and he remained there until 1952, when his father saw that there was no future for his young son in India. And so he sent him to join other family members in Karachi. And Khan, all through his life, has told this one small story about his trip. He was put on a train to leave India, and head to the Pakistani border. And the Indian police came through those loaded cars filled with Muslims. And they took everything of value – jewelry, money, you know, fancy clothing. Khan didn’t have anything of value except for a gold pen that he had received from recently graduating from high school. And an Indian police officer reached into his pocket, and plucked out that pen. And that was a symbol for A.Q. Khan that really would drive him many years later, and make him become this rogue nuclear scientist who was determined to help Pakistan build its atomic arsenal, to protect it against its archrival, India.
HH: I’m talking with Douglas Frantz and Catherine Collins, authors of The Nuclear Jihadist, and we will be doing that for the program today. Do not go anywhere. You’re going to figure out why I’m doing this. Catherine, do you think hatred for India is too strong of a term to attribute to A.Q. Khan? Or is that just what it is, unmitigated hatred?
CC: Oh, I think that’s what it is. And what it did was it sparked a nationalism for Pakistan that he was able to put into play. After he did his college education his early years in Pakistan, he went overseas to Europe, as many people from that part of the world do, because the educational opportunities were better, and he did his advanced degrees in Europe, and eventually got his PhD and went work at this lab in the Netherlands called Urenco, where they were developing the latest ultra centrifuges to enrich uranium. It was actually a joint project with the British, the Dutch and the Germans. And during that time period, India tested its first nuclear device, which was in 1974. And at that point, this restarted Khan’s hatred of India, his own nationalism, and he realized just serendipitously that he happened to be sitting on a wealth of information that he hoped he could take back to Pakistan in order to help Pakistan jump start its own nuclear program.
HH: And we’ll be going through that detail by detail. I think the key, though, at the beginning, for the audience to understand, is the depth of the animosity between these countries, because I just don’t think most Americans have an idea of the scope of intense conflict along that border. Do you two?
DF: Well, I think we do. I’ve been up to that border, and Cathy and I have both spent time in Pakistan, and I’ve been to India as well. And it’s a deep-seated hatred that continues today. They fight today primarily over Kashmir, which sits between India and Pakistan. It’s the one part of that region that wasn’t settled when the British divided, set the boundaries. But the Pakistanis and the Indians have fought three wars since partition in 1947, and the Pakistanis have come out on the short end of all three of those conflicts. And that was, and India is obviously a much larger country, a billion or so people there compared with 150 million Pakistanis. And so the Indians have a much larger army, and that really creates enormous fear in Pakistan. Their whole military perspective is facing east and looking at India.
HH: It’s clearly colored by that.
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HH: When we broke for our first break, and by the way, if you want to learn more, there is a website, www.thenuclearjihadist.com. When we broke for break, we were talking about the fact that India and Pakistan have been at each other’s throats since 1947 in the partition of India. We’ll come back to the three wars between them, and we’ll come back to Khan. But Doug, let me ask you for a second as well, to set up the American nuclear monopoly, and what Eisenhower did with Atoms For Peace, that was really part of unleashing this genie that then Khan managed to control to his own nefarious purposes.
DF: It was, Hugh, and that was one of the many surprises we found along the way in researching this book. In 1953, President Dwight Eisenhower created a program called Atoms For Peace. And frankly, like most people, I think, we’ve never really paid much attention to it. Atoms For Peace is a nice sounding word, and it connotes using nuclear energy for good to develop power, and for medical purposes, and other research. But as we looked into that, what we saw was two things. Eisenhower set up Atoms For Peace to mask the increase in the American nuclear arsenal. This was 1953, so dropping the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was fresh in the minds of Americans, but so of course was the rising Soviet threat. That’s when people were beginning to build bomb shelters, and we’d start to go through these duck and cover drills in schools. And so Eisenhower wanted to build up the American nuclear arsenal, and to go to hydrogen bombs as well, but he wanted a cover so that the public wouldn’t get alarmed. And so they set up Atoms For Peace, which was a program to send out nuclear research reactors to all kinds of countries. It was a way of spreading nuclear technology, it was a way of getting these countries under the American umbrella, the Western umbrella, if you will. And of course, the Soviets responded with their own program, and they began sending nuclear research facilities to countries within the Soviet sphere. So you had this competition to spread nuclear power at that time. I don’t think anybody was really thinking that they were spreading nuclear weapons technology, but what we know today is that the line between civilian uses of nuclear technology and the military applications of nuclear technology is very thin, very porous, easily, easily breached, as we’ve seen in so many instances, from the Indians and the Pakistanis and the Chinese, to the Israelis and the North Koreans, and certainly very soon, the Iranians.
HH: Let’s just jump ahead for a moment, and Catherine Collins, any doubt in your mind that knowing what you know from this book, and following the headlines, that Iran is poised to weaponize its nuclear capability if it decides to do so?
CC: Well, you know, that recent NIE report, the National Intelligence Estimate that came out, it was very interesting. And I think that some people missed the point of that. And the point was the report was largely about Iran’s nuclear weapons program. And what it said was yes, in fact, Iran did have a nuclear weapons program, which they closed down in 2003, which what we feel is more important is that Iran’s uranium enrichment program has continued unabated. And they are able to enrich uranium at a faster and faster rate. And fairly soon, we think, they will be enriching uranium at an industrial scale. And with some tinkering, that enrichment process could be altered in order to enrich uranium to the extent that it could be used for weapons. And at that point, that is the more difficult part of the process, at that point, the weapons program itself could be restarted, and Iran could be another member of the nuclear elite.
HH: That’s why I want everyone who cares about this issue to read The Nuclear Jihadist, because you can’t put the book down at the end and be anything except alarmed at the state of the nuclear program in Iran, and other places around the world, because it’s so easily transformed into a weapons program. But again, I’m ahead of myself. I just wanted to give you a preview of coming attractions. I want to go back to Atoms For Peace, Doug, for a second. Can you set up for us what the Eisenhower scheme was? I think it was basically we’ll give you the stuff we don’t think you can mess around with, but we’re going to keep the stuff like centrifuge design behind so you can’t possibly weaponize. Is that a good layman’s summary?
DF: Yeah, yeah, that’s very good. That’s well said. You know, they sent out small, small research reactors which would allow countries to become comfortable with the nuclear technology, to use it for medical research and scientific research. But these were very small reactors that couldn’t produce enough highly enriched uranium or plutonium for a nuclear weapon at that point. And so they kept…but another part of that, and Cathy just reminded me, another part of that is that also as part of Atoms For Peace, we sent them the reactors, and we volunteered to train their scientists. And so thousands of Indian scientists, and Iranian scientists during the era of the Shah, and scientists from all sorts of other countries, came to the United States, and they went to Britain. And others from the Soviet sphere went to Moscow. And they learned nuclear technology. And what Eisenhower and his supporters and successive administrations weren’t paying attention to was that this technology is easily transferable to a weapons program. But to go back to the part of your question again, Hugh, they did, the U.S. did try to keep track of the fuel. They tried to keep centrifuge technology as a top secret technology, and they refused to share it, even with their closest allies, the Germans and the British, which is how in the early 1970’s, after Richard Nixon refused to share this technology with countries that wanted it to fuel, they wanted the fuel for their own civilian nuclear plants, the Dutch and the Germans and the British formed this consortium called Urenco so that they could develop their own centrifuges, and use that technique to develop fuel for their nuclear power plants. But it’s a very, as we’ve said a couple times, a very thin line between developing it at low enriched levels for civilian uses, and highly enriched levels for weapons uses. So in a sense, the American policy of holding onto the fuel technology set the stage for A.Q. Khan’s arrival on the scene in the mid-1970’s.
HH: And let me ask you about that, Catherine, we’ve got about a minute and a half to the break, Urenco goes after centrifuge design, because the U.S. has a monopoly on it, and they begin to hire willy-nilly. And I’m just appalled at the level of detail which we can’t go in here, of the security sloppiness. They let anyone go to work at Urenco, apparently, including A.Q. Khan.
CC: Well, it’s funny, isn’t it? They didn’t exactly vet him very well. But they hired him, they were desperate. His skills were in metallurgy. He was a metallurgist. So they hired him to work with these highly specialized metals that are used in the centrifuge development. And they didn’t clear him, hire him to work in the most secure facility at Urenco. But as time went on, and they needed his other skills, they just moved him around to more and more secure areas without increasing his security clearance. And he never went in for that full examination. And perhaps, someone might have taken note of his nationality, and that Pakistan had a program. But they just never did it.
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HH: Now I’m going to do, in five minutes, Doug and Catherine, the hardest thing, but it’s very, very crucial. In the book, finally, someone explained to me in the kind of detail that a layman, an interested layman, needs, the differences between how you make a bomb from plutonium processes and how you make a bomb through uranium processes, and why they’re different, and which one’s harder. And you can’t possibly put it into a four or a five minute segment, Doug, but try and explain to people the two different paths to weapons of mass destruction, nuclear category.
DF: I will. I’ll do the best I can.
HH: In five minutes or less (laughing).
CC: Here’s to all scientists out there.
DF: (laughing) Well, there are. There are, as you say, there are two routes to a nuclear weapon. The United States and other countries have used both. The shorter, easier route is by taking the spent fuel from a nuclear reactor, putting it into a reprocessing plant, and turning it into plutonium. They reprocess these spent fuel rods, and turn out plutonium, which creates a very powerful nuclear weapon. But it also, that pathway, requires that you have an operating nuclear reactor, and it requires that you have this big, high-tech, major expenditure of a reprocessing facility to do that. And so that’s the one route. The other route is to take natural uranium ore, and to enrich it through a series of centrifuges. Centrifuges are tall cylindrical machines, maybe they’re six to eight feet tall, depending upon the type, and they spin at roughly twice the speed of sound. And they will spin for weeks, months, and sometimes years on end. And so they have to be very precisely balanced. And if you have an enrichment plant, all you need is this natural uranium ore. You put it into a process an turn it into uranium hexaflouride, and you can feed it into this series of centrifuges, which they call a cascade. And once you master the technology for these spinning centrifuges, you can turn them out. They’re a dime a dozen, and you turn out thousands of them. And unlike needing a nuclear reactor and a big eyesore of a reprocessing plant, you can take your centrifuges, and put a thousand of them in a gymnasium, you can bury then thousand of them in a tunnel in North Korea. They’re much easier to hide. They don’t have the kind of signature in the atmosphere that a reactor or a reprocessing do, so it’s more secretive. Mastering the initial technology is a little harder, but when you link these things in a series, and you spin the uranium gas, you turn out highly enriched uranium. And it’s…actually, once you master it, you can turn it out, you know, you can make enough bombs, you can make enough to supply a huge arsenal in a pretty short order.
HH: Let’s bottom line it. Pakistan had no bombs 25 years ago. How many do you think, or how many does the intelligence community estimate that they have now, Catherine?
CC: We’ve heard as little as fifty and as high as 120.
HH: And that’s all from uranium enrichment, correct?
DF: Yes, it is. They don’t have a plutonium project there, yet. It’s interesting, because back at the start, they tried to do it the plutonium way, but the United States persuaded other countries to not sell them, in fact, the reprocessing technology and the reprocessing plant they needed. So they were thwarted there. And that’s when A.Q. Khan came on the scene with his magic centrifuge technology, and he really brought them very quickly, and almost miraculously, into the nuclear weapons age.
HH: So the two things you need, or actually, the three things you need are uranium, and you need centrifuges, and eventually, you need a delivery system. And where did they get the uranium from, Catherine or Doug?
DF: They had their own uranium mines in Northeastern Pakistan. They have a fairly good supply there.
HH: And is that in unlimited supply, or at least as much as they need to continually produce more bombs?
DF: I think it was as much as they needed, Hugh. I’ve never heard of them importing uranium from other countries. In fact, I think on a couple of occasions, they may have exported some to Libya during Khan’s dealings with Libya, but that’s a little down the road for us, Hugh.
HH: And last question before the break, how many countries in the world do we think have uranium enrichment capacity sufficient to producing the gas, and then from the gas, the highly enriched uranium?
DF: Well, I’m not sure what that number is, but we do know that Mohamed ElBaradei, a little over a year ago, he’s the director of the United Nations nuclear watchdog agency, the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohamed ElBaradei gave a speech in which he said there are thirty or more countries that could essentially flip a switch and become nuclear powers, that they have the technology. Usually, it’s going to be from centrifuges, but some of these countries have big reactors, and could reprocess it and turn into plutonium. But there are at least thirty and possibly more countries that could become nuclear states almost overnight, in a matter of weeks or months.
CC: He called them virtual weapon-states.
HH: Virtual weapon-states. That should be a sharp blow to your stomach, America.
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HH: Catherine, let me go to you on this, because I’m going to leave Mr. Khan inside of the Urenco facility in Europe, and come back to India and Pakistan after partition. Can you tell us briefly about their three wars, and what they were fought over, and what India did in response to this?
DF: I’ve got to take that on, Hugh.
HH: All right, go ahead. I just keep going back and forth for the benefit of the voices.
DF: No, no, some of these, we’ve tried to sort of divide this up, because it was such a huge reporting task.
HH: Then I’m just going to ask the questions from here on, and you guys decide which one to answer it, okay (laughing)?
DF: Fair enough.
CC: We can see each other.
DF: That’s true. We’re within grabbing distance. The first war came in 1948, shortly after partition. It was a war over Kashmir. And the Indians just outmassed the Pakistanis and forced them down. In 1971, there was another critical war. Again, it was started over Kashmir. The Indian troops, the Pakistanis, rather, disguised some of their troops as commandos or as militants, and infiltrated into Kashmir, and started destroying some of the Indian settlements there, and the Indians massed for war. And within a matter of two or three weeks, this was from late ’71, or early ’71, I think, they routed the Pakistanis. And the rout was so thorough and so humiliating, that Pakistan was divided at that time. At that time, it had been East Pakistan and West Pakistan. And the Indians forced them to give up East Pakistan, which then became the new nation of Bangladesh. And Pakistan was whittled down in size and population.
HH: Doug, let me interrupt. What kind of casualties are we talking about in these wars?
DF: Oh, we’re talking about 10,000-12,000 casualties, not huge numbers of casualties at this point. But again, the point is that for Pakistanis, this created in their minds the idea that India really wanted to blow them completely off the map, to get rid of them, because they divided the country now, and they’d created Bangladesh out of East Pakistan, and so the people who remained in West Pakistan felt very threatened.
HH: You know, I was reading the book, and I thought to myself, Pakistan at that time must have felt a little bit like Mexico to our south in terms of this juggernaut across the region, across the border. Was it that great of a disparity in the minds of the Paksitanis?
CC: Well, it was. And there are accounts of Khan in Europe, from friends of his, weeping over the results, weeping over the images that appeared in the newspapers and magazines, on television. And when European columnist would weigh in about the aggression initiated by the Pakistanis, he began writing letters to the editor, and would write letters to professors who had spoken out about this. This was a crucial moment for him, and he was furious, and he talked about, going on for weeks without being able to study properly, about this. But I wanted to reflect back to something you said earlier on, which I thought was a really good point. This is a conflict that Americans simply do not, are not aware of, or don’t understand, because I think you’re right about that, because so many Americans have not been to these countries, and these are conflicts that did not, unlike Iraq, let’s say, these are conflicts that didn’t have a personal impact on us.
HH: I agree with that completely, because reading it, it’s vivid, it’s easy to grasp, but I just don’t know this, and I’m supposed to know stuff like this. So let’s go back to ’71. What happens after that, because I know there’s a third war coming.
DF: There is, and the critical, before we get to the third war, the critical aftermath or after-event of 1971 was that the military ruler of Pakistan was thrown out, they had elections, and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, a patrician, feudal Pakistani land owner, was elected to be the president of Pakistan.
CC: And this an important turn of events…
CC: …because Bhutto had been energy minister before that. And as energy minister, he’d been the first Pakistani to push for a nuclear weapons program. Initially, he’d been turned down by the Pakistani military, because they were afraid it would detract from their conventional weapons. But when Bhutto became prime minister in the early 70’s, he was able then, at that point, finally, to begin his nuclear weapons program.
HH: He must have been an amazing…of course, he’s the father of Benazir Bhutto, about whom most Americans are now aware. But he must have been an amazing man. The charisma that comes through in your book is of an extraordinary leader, though we can’t approve of what he was up to.
DF: Yes, we have, I think, a wonderful scene in the book in the Pakistani city of Multan, where in 1972, he has summoned secretly…
DF: …all of the military and scientific leaders of Pakistan, and they’re on the lawn of a beautiful, colonial house there, and there’s a big tent covering them, and he gets up and gives a fiery speech about the need for never being overrun by India, never being humiliated like this again, and the only way to stop that is to have our own nuclear weapon, what he called the Islamic bomb. And so that really was the official beginning of the Pakistani nuclear effort. And it stalled for two or three years there until A.Q. Khan came back and really rescued it for Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.
HH: Okay, we’ve got about a minute to the break. Take us back into the India-Pakistan conflict after ’71.
DF: Yeah, the next critical conflict came in 1999. It’s known as Cargill, because that was a mountain high in Kashmir. And Pervez Musharraf was the military general in charge of that operation. He created this, he sent some of his commandos up to take control of this mountaintop. And again, the Indians came in and they massed about 400,000 troops on the borders. And at that point, both of these countries have nuclear weapons. The year before, in 1998, India and Pakistan had both tested nuclear devices publicly, and the Clinton White House was absolutely apoplectic. They were very worried that this third war was going to turn into the nuclear Armageddon on the subcontinent of India. And so they dispatched, gosh, I can’t remember who it was, it was Gates, Bob Gates. I’m forgetting who it was.
HH: We’ll come right back and we’ll pick up that thread.
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HH: Before I go back into substance, I’m just curious, have you two been approached by television or movies? Because this is a mini-series.
DF: No, we haven’t. We’re kind of disappointed in that, actually.
CC: Who would you make the hero?
HH: I don’t know that there’s a hero…well, maybe, you know who’s a hero? Leonard Weiss, though my politics and his don’t agree at all, is a pretty interesting character, and I know some of these guys on the NSC who went chasing these nukes. And I also think Heinonen is a pretty cool guy. But I just mean, it’s fascinating how this happened, and it’s a mystery. So no one’s yet called up and said we want an option on this?
DF: No, nobody has. We’re a little surprised. I mean…but again, perhaps we shouldn’t be, because the sales have been kind of slow, too. It’s a topic that you need to devote that kind of time and thought that you are to it on your show, Hugh, for people to really pay attention to this. It’s not, you can’t explain this in three minutes, and it’s very easy for Americans to turn away from something like this. You know, this isn’t Charlie Wilson’s War.
DF: This is the real world, and this is, we think, the biggest threat going today.
HH: Oh, it’s scary. I told my audience when we were getting ready for this show, I listened to this book. I got the I-Tunes download, and I listened to it when I was running in the morning, and I couldn’t stop listening to it. Now I’m remembering most…I’ve got a hard copy in my hand to help me with the names, et cetera, but if you can listen to a book and remember everything in it, that’s riveting. And so I’m just surprised. Now very quickly before we go to the hour break, India, meanwhile, while Pakistan’s getting thumped by India, India decides to go nuclear. Why did they do that? Was that China? Or was it just in order to lord it over Pakistan?